Pekka Buttler, July–October 2026
Prologue: Quality is king, but a misunderstood king
If you’ve hung around photographers for any time, you’re sure to have encountered situations in which people are instructed by fellow photographers to stay away from off-brand offerings from companies like Sigma, Tamron, Tokina (etc.) based on the argument that off-brand companies cannot produce quality gear.
While there are some arguments in favour of choosing lenses, flashguns etc. from the same company that has made your system camera, the above argument signals a fundamental misunderstanding of what quality is and what it means.
While I am sure that any marketing/accounting/IT/HR/etc specialist would see their discipline as key to companies’ success, I argue that quality, specifically the ‘right’ quality, is crucial to success (and quality is not even my discipline). Incidentally I believe that quality also is the determining factor for why some lens-making companies are still in business, while many others are not.
Warning: I have a doctorate in business and as my day-job I am an educator. I am cutting a few corners here and simplifying things a bit in the following explanation, all for the benefit of easier access. Even so, this is a long article that does not have a single picture. It also does not have a lot of links to distract you because I’m afraid, I’m going to tax your attention. This is not an easy read and I’m not going to offer you a TL; DR version of the key points (this IS the TL; DR version).
In this article I’m going to try to explain and knit together a number of factors: quality, qualities, users, markets and segments, brands and competitive strategy – all talking about a topic that you’re likely going to like: lenses. I hope that makes you plough through to the end.
But first I want to talk about ladders, because they are so tangible.
What is quality (and why it is often misunderstood)
Assume you’re starting a company to manufacture aluminium ladders, and you need them to be safe up to 125 kilos. You have two ways to go.
The first way is to manufacture ladders and only sell those that hold up to an inspection at 125 kg (plus a generous safety margin). Let’s assume that 15% of your ladders fail that inspection. You’re not necessarily sure why they fail – it might be a bad batch of aluminium, a risky design, machining errors or simply because of bad workmanship. You can still sell 85% of your ladders, so it might be you’re not too bothered by not knowing why they fail…
One day you’re contacted by a buyer willing to buy a lot of ladders, but they’d need the ladders to be safe all the way up to 200 kilos. You decide to take a batch of 100 ladders and first subject them to your 125 kg test and then see how many would survive a 200 kg test. As expected, 15 ladders fail the 125 kg test and another 10 fail the subsequent 200 kg test.
On the face of it, this is good news, because it means that if the price offered for 200kg ladders is sufficiently higher than that of 125 kg ladders, then you can shift to selling 200 kg ladders. On the other hand, this also has the drawback that you can no longer sell 125 kg ladders because any ladder that would have held the 125 kg test but has failed the 200 kg test is no longer fit for selling.
And then there is the thing your inspection ‘manager’ said that you can’t shake: They remarked that a fair share of your ladders might actually be able to stand 300 kilos, even more.
Your first thought was “damn, I wish we could sell those for an even higher price”. Then another thought occurred to you: “what if we would know which ladders will likely clear the various weight inspections? That way we could minimise quality control losses and sell many quality levels of ladders…”
That thought is your first step away from the “quality happens” mindset and towards a more deliberate approach to quality (and business in general), because – whether you are aware of it or not – quality does not happen. Quality is the result of identifiable and (mostly) measurable steps.
The second approach to quality (and the approach used by every successful company) is to identify all the relevant qualities for a product and analyse the factors that produce (or hinder) those qualities.
Yes, plural (qualities), because unless you’ve never used a ladder, you know that how much weight it can take is by no means its only quality that affects a ladder’s attractiveness.
This second approach to quality is based on creating a process or procedure that aims to ascertain the quality of all the manufacturing’s inputs (both materials and work) and make sure that they meet defined parameters. The logic being this being that if you have a good design, quality materials, a sensible production system and skilled workers who know to keep away from the production line when their hands are shaking due to a ‘morning after’ (or flu, or whatever), then the qualities of the results are virtually guaranteed. There are many fancy words for this approach to quality, but I’ll simply refer to it as a ‘quality system’: a system created to – as far as possible – guarantee qualities.
Once a quality system has been adopted, the routine testing of finished products is no longer needed. Instead, the compressive inspection of finished products is replaced with spot-checking a random sample of products. Also, this spot-checking no longer just focuses on assessing the quality of finished products, it also assesses the robustness of the quality system.
In case you might be thinking “Aluminium, aluminum -what’s the difference? Both approaches can guarantee that ladders that we sell as certified for 125 kg can stand that load”. That is true, but in every other respect these approaches could not be more different, because only the later approach can give you information on why the ladder can hold 125 kg, which (materials, design, workmanship, etc.) is the weakest link, what you would need to do or change in order to make 200 kg ladders, or how you could achieve savings without endangering quality.
One approach helps you identify those products that meet your target, the other approach – once reasonably complete – allows you to set any target and devise a production system to match that target in a dependable fashion.
This ability to match any quality target becomes especially important when we consider that ‘top quality’ is not for everyone.
User segments
Keeping with the example of ladders, there are different kinds of users with different needs. A homeowner needs a ladder a few times a year to clean the gutters, an antenna repairer uses their ladders several times a day and needs to move them in and out of their van twice as much; some want their ladders to be as light as possible, some want the ladders to be as compact as possible, some need corrosion-resistant materials, some focus on how slippery the rungs are, some need ladders to deal with an uneven base…
One way to subdivide any market is by looking at the qualities that different kinds of users value the most. This division creates several groups that – while different – cannot necessarily be ranked. In parallel to this division, there is also the question of how much one (or one’s employer) is willing to spend on gear, with wealthier companies always being more able to invest in tools than – say – the one-man-shop.
Pretty much every market’s demand-side can be divided up into subdivisions or subgroups (which marketing calls ‘segments’ or ‘customer segments’). The idea being that within one segment the needs (most valued qualities) and paying power of all potential buyers is roughly the same while at the same time being different from that of all other segments. This way – whether you’re making ladders, ladles, looms or lenses – you can understand that all buyers do not want the same while also not conceptualising your entire market not as an anonymous and amorphous heap of different needs. Instead, you can identify a discrete number of key segments, estimate the market size of each of these and target your wares (and their qualities) directly at those segments.
You could try to enfold all the different needs of different users in one product, but that product would necessarily cost more than a product that is tailored to the needs of a narrower user group1. Hence, specialisation occurs, both in terms of special needs leading to differently oriented products but also in terms of stratification within otherwise similar segments.
Where the rubber meets the road qualities meet segments
One important aspect of segments is that not every segment wants top quality, especially not all the time, because top quality always comes at a price. If you want to be profitable in selling ladders, you will not want to sell ‘super-duper’ ladders as ‘basic’ ladders. Instead, you will aim to make your 125 kg ladders just a tad more attractive than those of the competition, without investing too much into those ladders, because you also want to make a profit from your ladders.
This means that for any product type, there is a miniscule slice of the market where “top quality, no matter the cost” rules, and in all other segments the relationship between qualities and price determines competitiveness (how many you can sell) and the relationship between price and cost define profit (and loss). This means that unless you’re in the business of selling gold-plated ladders as décor accessories for penthouse bachelor pads, you will need to focus on making your ladders just good enough.
Using better materials, more materials, cutting-edge machining techniques and zen-master workmanship will not make your basic ladders so much more competitive that you could stomach the added costs in manufacturing. Profitability comes from being able to balance the expenditure in qualities in such a way as to be able to take home a profit from a competitive market. The ‘right’ level of quality is crucial, and depending on your segment, that right level might be ‘top quality’, it might be ‘sturdy professional’, or it might be budget quality.
Back to (the lens) business
Now you might at this point say: “Okay, so the lenses by [insert third party brand] are less high quality because that’s what customers are willing to pay for. Does this not support the original claim that [third party] cannot make quality lenses?”
First, you would still be making the erroneous assumption that quality has only one criterion and that there can be products that are universally (for every segment) better. Remember: qualities, not quality.
Second, you would basically be assuming that third party lens makers (or makers of budget ladders) are just that because they do not have the ability to achieve higher qualities.
Such an assumption would be incorrect. Let me explain why.
(And now let’s start talking about lenses.)
Any company that manufactures products for a competitive market needs to be able to optimise its quality system with an eye toward the customer preferences. If A sells a fast tele zoom at the same price as B’s similar spec tele zoom, and consumers think that the A and B products are just as appealing but A manages to produce its lens cheaper, then A can take home a bigger profit, lower the price of its lens (rendering it more appealing) or a combination of both. In such an imbalance B will sooner or later need to tweak its quality system to regain parity/competitiveness or accept defeat2.
And what does any company need to have in order to be able to successfully fine-tune its quality system in a competitive market? They need to know the all the parameters of qualities and they need to know all the least expensive steps that they could take in order to improve qualities and they need to know all the ways they can cut costs without it having a marked detrimental effect on qualities.
If a company can be successful in any competitive market or market segment – no matter whether it’s a pro, amateur or budget segment – that company almost certainly has all the skills and abilities needed to produce products for the next one or two segments above.
In case you need examples of this, think of Canon, Fuji, Mamiya, Minolta, Nikon, Olympus, Pentax, Sony… All these companies have at various times dominated their own segments of the professional camera industry. Before that, all these companies used to be small-time upstarts with limited brand recognition. All these companies started in the shadow of established brands and managed to – bit by bit – erode the once unassailable competitive advantage of the earlier incumbents3
Imagining that it could not be done again is purely due to lack of imagination.
Why then are the upstarts not unseating the incumbents more often? It often has to do with brands – the corporate image and how it affects us. Human reasoning is – for better or worse – dependent on our ability to make judgments based on limited and insufficient evidence. Very often our decision-making is based on stereotypes – oversimplified images of a particular person or thing. We see a Canon camera and we draw some conclusions, both about the camera itself and (crucially) about the photographer. We see a photographer with a Canon camera and a non-canon lens, we again draw conclusions. Any photographer who has ever felt judged on the basis of their gear knows the feeling.
This is also why sometimes a budget segment champion needs to come up with (or acquire) a totally different brand in order to be able to move into more demanding market segments The classic example for launching a premium sub-brand is Toyota’s introduction of the Lexus brand, whereas in the acquiring a premium brand, we find a perfect example closer to home in Cosina’s acquisition and use of the Voigtländer brand.
Implications of a true understanding of qualities on the lens business
What does this mean for the lens business? It means that one should not think that the likes of Sigma, Tamron or Tokina could not produce lenses that would – in terms of technical qualities – rival the on-brand offerings of the likes of Canon, Nikon or Sony (or any of the other major brands). It simply means that they know that if they would, they would be able to replicate every other aspect of the competition, except the competitor’s brand advantage4.
In brutal terms (and I’m going to exemplify this with company names), If Tamron would want to compete head-to-head with a Canon, Tamron would need to accept that even if its lenses were in terms of qualities equal to Canon’s, Tamron would still need to price its lenses lower than Canon’s equivalent lenses because the Canon lens has a brand advantage on its side. The size of that brand advantage (Canon vs. Tamron) defines the price discount that Tamron needs to accept for its lenses to have some appeal. If this discount is more than a few percentage points, that might mean that while nothing would hinder Tamron from making lenses just as good as Canon’s, Tamron could not make such lenses at a profit.
Tamron (and Sigma and Tokina and others) do not compete head-to-head with the main brands because they choose not to (not because they could not match product qualities). Instead, they see that the market is broad and that there are other segments where profits can be made more dependably.
What this also means is, that if you’re one of those people who do not count brand-loyalty among your vices, then the third-party offering is likely a lucrative alternative for you.
The two ways to fail
This brings us back to the title: the two ways to fail.
Fundamentally business failure is always caused by costs exceeding incomes over a longer term, leading to a company going under (or needing to withdraw from loss-making activities). There are however two ways by which a company can get stuck in a situation where they’re making losses.
One way (and the way most people think about) is that a company is unable to make an attractive enough product, leading to slow sales and costs exceeding incomes. In relation to the terminology used in this article, such a situation might be caused by a company being unable to manufacture a product that the customer is attracted to (even considering the price paid). Such judgments are always ‘dynamic’ in nature, meaning that it impossible to say whether a product is a ‘bad deal’ without considering the alternative deals available. These ‘alternatives’ include both the upmarket offerings from main brands, as well as – more relevantly – the competing offerings of other third-party lensmakers.
The other way (and the one that inspired this article) is that a company might be stuck making a too good product. In such a situation the company is making a good product, but is not able to sell it at a price that would cover costs (and investors’ expectations). While the product itself is attractive, it is not attractive enough for the company to be able to raise its price to make a profit.
To summarize: whenever there exists a competitive market, companies can fail because their products are not as good as their price would necessitate (and as a result they do not sell enough to make a living), but companies can also fail if their products are too good (i.e. too expensive to make) considering the price they need to sell at to remain attractive.
Epilogue: Are there ‘hidden diamonds’ – lenses that are just too good for their price?
First, let’s clear up one thing: Professional lens making is a scientific, precise business, and spectacular lenses happen by accident only marginally more often than men give birth.
That however does not mean that you might not be able to find a lens where the qualities–price relationship is unusually good. But to have a decent look at this, we have to distinguish between new and second-hand products, because “too good for the price” means different things in different cases.
New lenses: the (business) logic behind making ‘too good’ products.
First, even though making too good a product for the price does not happen by accident, but doing just that might indeed be part of a company’s deliberate long-term strategy, we’ll look into why a company might want to choose such a strategy. But first, let’s remind ourselves of a basic point.The classic definition (Economics 101) of a perfectly free market contains the assumption that both buyers and sellers need to have total, cost-free knowledge of prices, utility and quality and that only then will the price of goods automatically reflect quality. Obviously, in selling complicated gear (including cameras and lenses) information is very imperfect, partially due to qualities not being objectively measurable in a way that would match every consumer’s preference and partially due to that all qualities are not equally visible5.
In these situation there needs to be made a clear distinction between those qualities that can be easily ascertained without even trying the product (overt qualities), those that you can notice only once you’ve used the product (covert qualities), and those that become apparent only over a long time (latent qualities). These three types of qualities can be exemplified (in the case of lenses) by
• mainline specifications such as zoom factor, maximum aperture, size & weight and other features (overt qualities)
• ergonomics and image quality such as sharpness and lack of obvious aberrations (covert qualities)
• whether the coatings flake off, rubber rings crumble, aperture blades become sluggish and any other quality issues that develop over time (latent qualities).
In these situations, it is likely that (ceteris paribus; other factors remaining equal) that a lens that has more ambitious mainline specifications (e.g. 35 mm f/2 vs. 35 mm f/2.8) will be able to fetch a higher price, whereas with covert and latent qualities the same mechanism cannot exist in quite the same way. Let’s take some examples to illustrate:
Lens B1 (brand) and lens N1 (noname) share the same overt qualities, but lens N1 is less than half the price. The reason why lens N1 is not outselling lens B1 handsomely is a combination of brand and assumptions that the covert and latent qualities of lens N1 are considerably weaker.
Or we might have lens B2 and N2, but this time lens N2 has an advantage in terms of overt qualities: it might be lighter, a tad faster, have a wider zoom range or some other overt quality. Again N2 is cheaper than B2, and again N2 has a mountain to climb in terms of assumptions regarding its covert and latent qualities.
Hence, when we’re talking about a company that makes ‘too good’ lenses (in relation to price) we’re typically referring to cases where covert and/or latent qualities exceed expectations.
We’ve already (above) discussed that third party lens makers rarely can (nor should) try to compete with camera makers’ lens operations on the same terms. At the same time companies do whatever they can to avoid competition (because the more competition there is, the less potential for profits there are). This means that companies might still want to differentiate or move upmarket – not to compete with the camera makers, but to lift themselves from the crushing competitive pressures at the entry-level.
However, just putting a gold band on your lens, or adding a snazzy extra acronym is not enough for a company to successfully up their game. On the contrary, they need to show that their covert and latent qualities exceed expectations and are – if not quite better or equal than their brand rivals – within striking distance of the brand competition. They need to – objectively – make good lenses.
It is here journalists (in the olden days) and online pundits (nowadays) – in short: the media – come into the picture: Through rigorous (and impartial) reviews, most of the covert qualities of a lens can be brought from the realm of risk and opportunity into play as overt-like qualities (they might still not be listed in the advertisement, but any discerning buyer can figure them out). Hence – at least for those who ingest media reports – overt and covert qualities are effectively comparable.
How about the latent qualities? Latent qualities are all about the long haul, and have in part to do with reliability (“She was just about to say ‘I do’ when the AF motor jammed!”) and long-term endurance (“This lens will last years of hard use, I will have time to recoup the investment!”). Importantly, these criteria are less important in the amateur segment and become gradually more important as we move towards the pros. Interestingly, hard facts about the latent qualities of lenses can only be arrived at over time. Hence, assumptions about latent qualities are very much brand-defined6.
Moreover, while the levels of all other qualities are typically highly deliberate, there exists a real element of uncertainty with latent qualities. Using new (and untried) manufacturing techniques, new (and untried) materials, new (and untried) coatings, new (and, you guessed it: untried) lubricants really does lead to an uncontrollable uncertainty factor.
Setting aside those uncontrollable uncertainty factors, there are some rather obvious ceteris paribus (all other factors remaining equal) conclusions that can be drawn from these first principles:
• An off-brand lens will on average offer a higher qualities–price ratio (or ‘bang for buck’) than an on-brand lens7.
• An ambitious lens by a manufacturer that is currently trying to move towards higher market segments will on average offer higher bang for buck than a comparable lens by a manufacturer who is not trying to move towards higher market segments.
• Any lens that has a rising price trend (after discounting extraneous factors like tariffs or currency fluctuations) is likely offering more bang for buck than other lenses.
• Any lens that uses new materials, manufacturing techniques, or simply: does something radically different is at a heightened risk for latent qualities becoming issues later on.
• Finally, a high-grade lens from an off-brand manufacturer that is currently moving to challenge (in terms of qualities) the on-brand offering might not only be offering better bang for buck, it might actually be the better lens.
Please note, that (with the exception of the final bullet point) we are not discussing qualities alone, but the qualities–price ratio.
In summary, even if every actor in the market had perfect knowledge of all the alternative products, this does not necessarily lead to comparable competitiveness among all alternative products. There are two explanations for this: one static and one dynamic.
The static (right now) explanation has to do with brands, as we’ve already noted that (on average) brands increase products’ competitiveness without actually improving their innate qualities. We can also see that there are some people who are more brand conscious (who would not want to be seen with off-brand gear) and some that are less brand-conscious. For the brand-conscious, the on-brand offering will always be attractive, whereas – precisely because of all the brand-conscious people – to the less brand-conscious the off-brand offering will always be a good deal.
The dynamic (right now was also once in the future) explanation has to do with company trajectories, and how companies that are unhappy with their current competitive position and have the means to do something about that, will likely put out products where the qualities significantly exceed the competition (at the same price point).
The classic example of this is the 1964 8-element Super-Takumar by Asahi Opt. Co. A lens that (considering its then price) was miles ahead of the competition and helped improve Asahi’s reputation immensely, but was also so expensive to manufacture that Asahi lost money on every copy made, leading to its subsequent (1966) replacement with a cheaper-to-build version.
How about legacy lenses? Are there diamonds in the rough there too?
When looking at legacy lenses, it is imperative to understand that the second-hand market of legacy lenses differs in several key ways:
First: In terms of supply, there is a hard cap on supply, and it is only growing smaller each year8. While we have seen some classic lens recipes having been resurrected (by companies such as the new Meyer-Optik), these do not really compete for the same audience.
Second: There are no Joe Public’s in this demand pool. Everyone who wants to buy a legacy lens whether to mount it on granddad’s old Spotmatic, mount it on their mirrorless still/cine camera or add it to their collection is a specialist of sorts.
Third: When a product that is being manufactured sees increased demand, that leads to an increase in price, which signals the manufacturer to increase production. When a product that is out of production (whether that should be a 1964 8-element Super Tak or a 1964½ Mustang) sees increased demand, the price cannot but rise until enough people in the demand pool reconsider. In effect, the inflexibility of supply means that prices see greater volatility – the smaller the supply pool, the greater the volatility.
Four: For the moment the proliferation of mirrorless cameras has created a resurgence of demand that – in the case of most lens mounts – had not been seen for decades. The ‘back to analogue’ movement is increasing the demand growth, and it is possible that as a counterreaction to generative AI’s increasing abilities to fake images, the interest in all analogue gear will increase further. Or then demand might suddenly start sinking.
Five: Related to the above, many legacy lenses are prized for what would be classed as imperfections or outright failures if we were comparing it to a modern lens. Herein, a lens that exhibits a signature rendering (implicitly: a rendering that is not only different, but also one that you cannot recreate with many other lenses) – essentially an unusual combination of imperfections9 – will see rising demand (until prices rise to make enough people reconsider).
Six: Today latent qualities of old lenses can be – to some degree – ascertained. That said, there are considerable selection biases, because if you compare two 50-year old cameras, then the more expensive/exclusive camera is likely to have seen regular service whereas the run-of-the mill off-brand product is likely to have been neglected. The reason many 80+ year old Leicas are even today in working order is only partially due to the innate latent qualities of that camera. Conversely, if you stumble upon a Leica that has never heard of a CLA, you’ve bought an overpriced discussion piece.
Seven: Sample variation is a bit**. While the manufacturer’s quality control has made pretty sure that all samples coming off the assembly line have been of quite similar qualities, time has treated samples differently. In part that means that pundits would do well to remember the basic rule of statistics – you cannot reliably generalise from a sample of 1 – but it also means that every copy of the 8-element Super Tak is a bit of an individual. While some lenses are notorious for supernormal sample variation (whether that is objectively true or not), that again tells absolutely nothing about the sample that you’re considering to buy or sell. Furthermore, as the manufacturer’s guarantee likely ran out ≈50 years ago, the disappointed buyer’s only recourse is a generous return policy.
The confluence of these key differences leads to some rather unusual market behaviour.
First, we need to acknowledge that the size of the maximum supply pool (the number of remaining lenses) is a key determinant: Some lenses are just in so abundant supply, that they will never become really expensive – not even when it turns out10 that scenes in a recent action movie were shot by one of these lenses. Conversely, there are lenses out there where the simple fact of their rarity makes them valuable to collectors. In this, their qualities – whether overt, covert, or latent do not really come into play as pure collectors do not use their lenses11.
Second, there are ‘special’ lenses and there are bread & butter lenses. Special lenses can be special either because of their qualities (overt, covert or latent) or they can be special because of their historic significance. The first attracts users, the second collectors. Some lenses manage to combine both, but neither will lead to a high price without a significantly limited supply. The reason cinemodders have flocked to Zeiss-Contax lenses (among others) is certainly due to the qualities of these lenses, but the reason for why the 18/4 fetches so much higher a price than the 50/1.4 is not because it is a better or more (usage) valuable lens, simply because its rarity.
These two factors together mean that the market of legacy lenses is extremely polarised with many lenses fetching prices one order of magnitude above lenses of similar qualities (and in some, rare cases: two orders of magnitude).
Moreover, in the legacy lens business price is not primarily an indicator of qualities. The reason that the 8-element Super Tak fetches somewhat higher prices than any of the 7-element designs that replaced it is partially due to historical significance, mostly due to comparative rarity (≈130 000 manufactured 8-element versions vs ≈ 1 300 000 manufactured 7-element versions), and little (if at all) due to optical qualities12.
Finally, because supply is limited and the legacy lens ecosystem is comparably well connected, the market has a high risk for speculative behaviour. As soon as a well-respected pundit exhorts a rare lens, some will rush out to buy it “while I still can make money on flipping it.” This further increases the price volatility on the rarer lenses.
Are there diamonds in the rough? First we need to define ‘diamonds’. Are we talking about lenses that offer good bang for buck in terms of real qualities or are we talking about lenses that are currently undervalued and will likely appreciate?
Usage value (for the pure user)
First, the fact that you’re reading this likely means that you can deal with manual focus. Good. Keep in mind however that that makes you special and you’re not going to convince your neighbour to leave their Insta360 at home when their taking the family to the Mediterranean (and pack a film camera instead).
In terms of usage value, the key question is “what do you value about your legacy lens?”.
If you just want to use legacy lenses to slow down, to celebrate other factors of photography over clinical sharpness; or to have a vintage filter – that is totally up to you. There are no right or wrong ways to use legacy lenses. This also means that there is a significant individual component to what is ‘usage value’.
That said, in terms of usage value – unless you’re in for that Trioplan bubble bokeh or some similar rarity – you can steer straight away from all the rare, really expensive legacy lenses. There are simply so many (in terms of usage value) tremendously cost-effective lenses out there, and many of them are in such abundance that it would not affect their prices even if I mentioned them (and I have mentioned some here on JAPB).
Even so, we can see that some lenses have an established following, while others have been comparatively neglected, for example because they have only become targets for adapted use after the advent of mirrorless cameras or because availability of adapters has been a bottleneck. I’ll leave you to figure out which those are.
Future value (for the pure collector)
For the pure collector, there is only one guideline: rarity. For the affluent, pure collector that is extended to include mint quality with original caps etc.
Naturally there are those brands that almost inevitably attract collectors as well as those that do not, but any distinct lens that was manufactured only in the hundreds or thousands (and not in the hundreds of thousands or more) is likely to cost one order of magnitude extra. If the lens is part of a special subset13 then that too can lead to a significant rise in price.
For the speculative collector the situation is a bit tricky, because the only way to increase price is to increase demand, whereas a fall in demand would obliterate values. Notwithstanding unethical pump-and-dump practices, the only way to optimise future value is to be ahead of the curve – to hope to spot a lens (or manufacturer) before everyone else does.
How about the user–collector (or collector-user)?
Well now. This is a bit tricky, because on the one hand I am a representative of this class. On the other hand, I should not assume that I can extrapolate my motives, because I – as the writer of this rag and as someone who long ago decided never to sell photography services – am also in many key ways a very bad representative of this segment.
You tell me (in the comments)!
Footnotes
- Moreover, there often are situations within which the needs of one segment run counter to the ones of another segment and both sets of needs cannot (physically) be realised at the same time. ↩︎
- Technically, this is true if both A and B produce only tele zooms. If both A and B produce a wide range of lenses then B can live with A’s tele zooms being somewhat more competitive if B has a comparable advantage in another lens category. ↩︎
- In the case of several of these companies the transformation from unknown entity to industry champion was aided by a technological shift (e.g. the introduction and rise of the SLR or the advent of autofocus or of digital photography or of mirrorless technology), in combination with the inability of the incumbents to get their act together. ↩︎
- There are several examples of third-party lensmakers trying to (sometimes with some success) raise their own segment appeal by launching more ambitious sub-brands (e.g. the Tamron SP line and the Sigma ‘Art’ lenses). ↩︎
- (at times exacerbated by the effects of marketing and brands). ↩︎
- I have heard the argument that – given how valuable brands are to those that have them – brands virtually guarantee latent qualities because no brand would gamble with its reputation. I do not fully agree. First, there is the aspect of uncontrollable uncertainties (see next). Second, we have also seen situations where big brands have gotten away with quality disasters that would have totally buried less established brands. ↩︎
- Note! Remember the ’Ceteris paribus’, meaning that this only applies among reasonably similarly competitive products. ↩︎
- On the other hand, as the price for legacy gear rises, some forgotten treasures might be unearthed form the backs of cupboards, hence alleviating some of the demand inflexibility. Even so, there really is a hard cap on maximum supply and entropy is not being gentle. ↩︎
- One of the most archetypal examples of this is the Meyer-Optik Görlitz Trioplan 100/2.8 – a lens that evidences such egregious overcorrection of spherical aberrations (see more here) that it has become a special effects lens. ↩︎
- https://www.4kshooters.net/2022/05/06/the-batman-film-uses-vintage-helios-44-lenses/ ↩︎
- I know you might hate me for saying so, but I’ve grown up in a family where collecting was just as natural behaviour as doing sports (actually more so) and I’ve worked large parts of my life around dealing with collectors. A pure collector is someone who wants a product for its rarity, a pure user is someone who only appreciates the usage value of a product, a user–collector is one who tries to combine both but might end up internally conflicted. ↩︎
- In this example it is obvious that if the numbers were 13 000 copies vs 130 000 copies, the price premium of the 8-element version would be more significant (there seems to still be enough 8-element copies for everyone who wants one). ↩︎
- For instance Topcor lenses made for the US Navy or the 37802-version of the 7-element Super Takumar 50 mm f/1.4 ↩︎